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1. Introduction 
Declining FDI barriers are dramatically restructuring the global economy. Advances in 
transportation and communication technology and multilateral reductions in FDI related policy 
barriers have led to a disproportionate expansion of production by multinational firms relative to 
less efficient domestic firms.1 Today the total value-added generated by multinational foreign 
affiliates is over 10% of global GDP, more than twice the share contributed 20 years ago 
(UNCTAD, 1990 and 2011).2 Given their superior technology and management expertise, 
multinational firms have been viewed as strong contributors to technological diffusion and 
economic development (Markusen, 2004). Nonetheless, their potential displacement effects on 
domestic activity have also generated growing anxiety towards their recent rise. 
This paper seeks to quantify the impacts of FDI globalization on intra-industry 
reallocations and its implications for aggregate productivity. The firm-heterogeneity model of 
trade predicts that economic integration will lead to aggregate productivity gains and 
displacement of less productive firms. With the high fixed costs of foreign market participation, 
declining barriers favor the most productive firms in expanding abroad, whereas less productive 
firms contract under increased foreign competition (Melitz, 2003). Many previous studies have 
quantified the intra-industry reallocations resulting from trade liberalization (Pavcnik, 2002; 
Bernard et al., 2003).3 However, FDI plays a more dominant role in globalization and we know 
very little about the empirical magnitudes of reallocation being channeled through declining 
FDI barriers.4 
We apply the simulation model developed by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011, EKK 
                                                  
1 While FDI barriers are not explicitly measurable, Gormsen (2011) estimates that FDI barriers have 
halved every 4.8 years and contributed to over 75% of the growth in FDI stocks in recent decades. 
2 Total value added (including domestic production) by multinationals amounted to over 25% of 
global GDP. 
3 Pavcnik (2002) finds that trade liberalization in Chile generated a 30% increase in aggregate 
productivity due to the reallocation of activity from less efficient to more efficient firms. Through 
ex-ante simulations of falling trade barriers, Bernard et al. (2003) quantified large reallocations of 
production activity from less to more productive firms among U.S. manufacturing firms.   
4 Today worldwide sales of foreign affiliates are more than twice those of exports (UNCTAD, 
2011). 
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hereafter) to Japanese multinational enterprises (MNEs) and estimate a model of heterogeneous 
firms facing fixed and variable FDI barriers. We use the general equilibrium model to simulate 
how multinationals respond to declining FDI barriers and quantitatively assess the resulting 
extent of intra-industry reallocations and its implications for aggregate productivity 
improvements. In an era of global competition, the welfare of small domestic firms is a widely 
covered concern, but excessive protection of relatively less productive firms could have adverse 
impacts on aggregate productivity growth. Given the politically sensitive nature surrounding 
FDI globalization, a quantitative assessment will be useful for policy discussions on FDI.5 
We first provide evidence that the EKK model designed for trade is also consistent with 
Japanese multinational activity. Dissecting the micro-level data, we find supporting evidence for 
high fixed costs of multinational entry, costly technology transfer, Pareto distribution of foreign 
affiliate sales, and a weak pecking order of productivity sorting for multinational activities 
across markets. Estimating the structural parameters of heterogeneous firms by the simulated 
method of moments, we conduct model validation exercises. The results show that simulated 
multinationals fit the actual Japanese multinational activity quite well in terms of the moments 
used in estimation as well as out-of-sample activity that occurred under a significantly different 
environment of FDI barriers from the period used for estimation. 
Having validated the model for data on Japanese multinationals, we use the estimated 
model as a quantitative tool to examine how multinational firms respond to declining 
investment barriers. Applying a hypothetical 20% reduction in both variable and fixed 
investment barriers, we find that falling barriers lead to asymmetric changes across 
heterogeneous firms at the intensive and extensive margins. Increased competition from inward 
FDI reduces domestic production by all firms and forces the least productive firms to exit. Due 
                                                  
5 The anxieties over globalization and the rise of multinationals are widely covered in the media.  
In 2008, 2 out of every 3 EU citizens believed globalization was beneficial only for large 
corporations while 78% of Americans viewed globalization favorably in 2002, which declined to 
59% in 2007. After the 2008 financial crisis, the majority of Americans viewed it as a threat 
(Economist, February 19, 2009).   
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to high fixed setup costs of foreign production, the growth of foreign production is primarily 
yielded by the most productive firms. While the top quintile of firms grow by over 30%, the 
remaining bottom 80% of firms contract by over 3%. The resulting reallocation of production 
from less efficient to more efficient firms may generate up to a 30.7% improvement in 
aggregate productivity. Our numerical results are consistent with the actual asymmetric growth 
expansions observed over the last decade in Japan’s manufacturing sector. 
Our analysis is related to the literature that attempts to assess the gains from increasing 
multinational production. 6  Extending the neoclassical growth model to multinational 
production, Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009) and McGrattan and Prescot (2009) find that 
multinational firms generate welfare gains through “knowledge capital transfer”. Using a 
Ricardian framework, Ramondo (2011) and Ramondo and Rodrigeuz-Claire (2009) find that 
openness to FDI leads to large gains through technology transfer. While these papers employ 
multi-country general equilibrium models to quantify welfare gains, their approach relies on 
aggregate measures of FDI activity and they do not explicitly account for the micro-level 
activities of individual firms and differences between fixed and variable FDI barriers. 
By contrast, our application of the micro-simulation approach by EKK allows us to 
simulate firm-level changes from falling FDI barriers and quantify aggregate productivity gains 
through intra-industry reallocations. Since tracking the extent of market-share reallocation 
depends upon firm-level changes in sales and level of penetration across multiple foreign 
markets, it is important to model individual firm responses to FDI barriers. Combined with firm 
heterogeneity, fixed and variable barriers to FDI carry different consequences for firm-level 
conditions of entry and sales across markets because the overall magnitude of these impacts 
depends upon the distributional structure of firms and the sensitivity to these barriers. Our 
results show that the counterfactual changes in Japanese MNEs depend strongly on the nature of 
investment barriers; aggregate productivity improvements are larger from variable barriers 
                                                  
6 Our analysis is also related to recent micro-level studies on the location decisions of heterogeneous 
multinationals (Grossman et al., 2006; Aw and Lee, 2008; Yeaple, 2009; Chen and Moore, 2010). 
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compared to fixed barriers, as is consistent with the findings for exporting firms in di Giovanni 
and Levchenko (2010). 
Before describing the details, we must emphasize that our application of the EKK 
framework captures many features of multinational production, but does not account for the role 
of trade.7 As previous work such as Helpman et al. (2004) shows that FDI and exporting 
decisions may be jointly related, our results must be interpreted with caution. If FDI and trade 
are substitutes, foreign activity by MNEs may displace part of their domestic activity. On the 
other hand, if FDI and trade are complementary, foreign operations may increase their domestic 
activity. However, existing evidence on the linkage between FDI and trade is mixed, making it 
difficult to predict the direction of bias in our simulations.8 In this study, we ignore the 
interaction effects between trade and FDI within firms, focusing solely on the market-share 
reallocations between firms.9 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data sources and 
recent trends in the Japanese manufacturing sector. Section 3 presents an EKK model of 
multinational production, with supporting evidence from the Japanese data. Section 4 
summarizes the procedure used to estimate structural parameters of the model and 
model-validation exercises. Section 5 presents counterfactual simulation analysis. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                  
7 This limitation is due to the lack of Japanese firm-level data on export sales by destination 
8 Blonigen (2001) finds both complementary and substitution effects for the Japanese automobile 
multinationals investing in the U.S. while Yamashita and Fukao (2010) find that the overseas 
operations of Japanese MNEs do not reduce their domestic employment. Irarrazabal et al. (2010) 
find that with intra-firm trade, a reduction in FDI barriers could lead to increased domestic activity. 
9 Recent studies such as Ramondo and Rodriguez-Claire (2009) and Garetto (2010) quantitatively 
examine FDI and exports in a unified framework by developing a structural model of traded inputs 
between multinational firms and their affiliates. However, these studies place less attention on the 
role of individual firm activity.  
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2. Data and the Stylized Facts of Japanese Multinational Firms 
This section discusses the data sources for Japanese multinational and domestic firms. It 
then describes recent structural changes in the Japanese manufacturing sector to motivate our 
empirical study.  
 
2.1 Data Sources 
 Data on Japanese firms come from the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and 
Activities by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). The survey 
covers all business firms with 50 employees or more and capital of 30 million yen or more in 
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. Our analysis is based primarily on the 2006 
survey. The 2006 sample accounted for 5% of total firms and 60% of total employees in the 
Japanese manufacturing sector.10 Meanwhile, data on foreign affiliate activity are from the 
Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities by METI. The survey covers manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing firms that are headquartered in Japan and own at least one foreign business 
enterprise.11 In the 2006 survey, there were 2,165 parent firms in manufacturing, which 
accounted for 31% of total employees of manufacturing firms in the Basic Survey of Japanese 
Business Structure and Activities. 
 After linking domestic parent firm activity to their manufacturing foreign affiliates and 
excluding the affiliates that were not operating and/or had no sales information, our dataset 
consists of 2,032 parent firms with 7,626 foreign affiliates across 70 markets in 2006. In this 
sample, the total sales by foreign affiliates were 99.1 trillion yen. The average Japanese 
multinational maintained four foreign affiliates with foreign sales of 5.7 billion yen per affiliate. 
However, domestic sales are missing for some parent firms, making it difficult to measure a 
linkage between domestic and foreign sales. Because including these parent firms does not alter 
                                                  
10 The surveyed sample included 12,855 manufacturing firms with 4.9 million employees in 2006. 
11 A foreign business is defined as one in which 10 percent of the affiliate’s equity shares are owned 
by a Japanese parent firm. 
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our results quantitatively, we use the reduced sample of 1,656 parent firms with complete 
information on sales. 
 
2.2 Structural Changes in the Japanese Manufacturing Sector 
 Dissecting the detailed firm-level data, we describe several important structural changes in 
the Japanese manufacturing sector that occurred during the past decade under a period of falling 
investment barriers. We first assign firms into percentile bins by their 1996 volume of global 
production which includes domestic, export, and foreign affiliate sales at the firm-level.12  
Table 1 tabulates the number of all firms and multinational parent firms for both years adjusting 
the sales intervals for the 1996 percentile bins into 2006 prices. Comparing these periods, we 
observe that the total number of firms declined by 8.9% from 14,117 to 12,855. On the other 
hand, the total number of multinational parents increased by 72.5% from 960 to 1,656. 
Decomposing the aggregate changes, we find that small firms disproportionately decreased in 
number, and large firms were more likely to become multinational. In terms of the extensive 
margin growth, foreign expansion was skewed towards larger firms. 
=== Table 1 === 
 Next, we examine production by Japanese firms. Between 1996 and 2006, the total volume 
of domestic production declined by 7.1%, whereas foreign production increased by 98.9%. The 
substantial growth of offshore production offsets the contraction in domestic production, 
whereby global production employing Japanese technology increased by 3.8% from 464.5 to 
482.0 trillion yen. To illustrate the changes at the intensive margin, Table 2 shows the volume of 
production per firm in billions of 2006 yen across the percentile bins that are defined for 1996 
and 2006, separately. In terms of the intensive margin, domestic production increased on 
average by 2.0%, and foreign production by 15.2%. On average, total production per firm 
increased by 14.0%. 
                                                  
12 The following results are similar when the size is measured by domestic employment or when 
export sales are excluded. 
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=== Table 2 === 
 
 Dissecting the aggregate changes reveals large differences across Japanese firms by size. In 
the bottom percentiles, firms experienced an increase in the average volume of their foreign 
production, but a fall in their domestic production. Together, their average volume of total 
production contracted. By contrast, firms in the middle and upper percentiles (30–99) increased 
their average production both at home and abroad. In the top 1%, a substantial increase in 
average offshore production dominated a fall in average domestic production, leading to a 
sizeable rise in total production per firm. Since these trends are drawn from cohort linked decile 
groups rather than panel linked firms, we cannot strictly interpret the changes occurring in the 
intensive margins. Nevertheless, the trends indicate that Japan’s distributional production 
structure has substantially changed. Accounting for offshore production, global production per 
firm has increased disproportionately more for larger, multinational firms relative to smaller, 
domestic firms. 
These findings have implications for aggregate productivity. As is shown in the literature 
on productivity dynamics, industry productivity growth can be attributed to reallocations of 
production shares of heterogeneous firms in that industry or within firm-level productivity 
improvements (Foster et al., 2001). Petrin et al. (2011) finds that micro-level reallocation of 
production resources from less to more productive plants generates a larger contribution to 
aggregate productivity growth for the manufacturing sector in the United States. However, prior 
studies on productivity dynamics have not necessarily distinguished between domestic and 
foreign production in measuring reallocation effects, and there has been little investigation of 
how foreign-market expansion may also improve aggregate productivity (Foster et al., 2001).  
The observed reallocations in Table 2 are important because of the existence of firm 
heterogeneity in productivity, which is related to firm size and multinational status. Normalizing 
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value added per worker at the median value, we found that average labor productivity increases 
with the firm size for both 1996 and 2006 samples. In 1996, for instance, the smallest 10% of 
firms were on average 43% less productive than the average firm whereas the largest 10% of 
firms possessed a labor productivity advantage of over 160%. Furthermore, Tomiura (2007) 
finds that multinational firms in Japan are 60% more productive than non-multinationals. As 
large multinationals are more productive than smaller domestic firms, the observed market share 
reallocations over the past decade would necessarily translate into potentially large productivity 
gains without any technological improvements within firms. 
For Japan, changes in domestic reallocation efficiency were found to account for over 80% 
of all aggregate productivity growth over the last decade (Inui et al., 2009). While Japan 
experienced a domestic productivity slowdown that has averaged less than 0.5% per year from 
1994–2005 (Inui et al. 2009), we know little about how the reallocation of activity towards more 
efficient multinational production has impacted resource use and aggregate productivity. In this 
respect, the Japanese manufacturing industry offers an interesting case study for assessing 
productivity gains from reallocation of technological resources via multinational activity.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
Our theoretical framework is adapted from the heterogeneous exporting firm model of 
EKK (2011) which incorporates stochastic entry and demand stocks into a Melitz model. We 
adapt their model to multinational activity by allowing firms to engage in foreign markets 
through FDI, excluding the role of trade. Instead of incurring iceberg trade costs, heterogeneous 
firms must pay technology transfer and management costs to serve foreign consumers via 
offshore production. This section briefly presents a modified version of the EKK model for 
multinational production. Key elements of the model are monopolistic competition, Pareto 
distribution of firm efficiency, and variable and fixed costs of operating offshore production. 
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3.1 Firm Heterogeneity 
There are N host countries with factor cost wn. Each country has a continuum of potential 
producers, each producing a unique good j with efficiency ݖ௜ሺ݆ሻ. A set of firms that originate 
from country i can produce good j in country n with unit costs given by: 
ܿ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ
௪೙ௗ೙೔
௭೔ሺ௝ሻ
          (1) 
Unit costs increase with host market’s factor costs, wn, and an iceberg form of efficiency loss dni, 
but decrease with firm-level productivity ݖ௜ሺ݆ሻ.
13 Each pair of countries i and n is separated by 
technology barriers that rise in dni. In this setting, dni can be interpreted as the variable costs of 
operating offshore production that include information costs of working abroad, transaction 
costs of dealing with FDI policy barriers, or servicing network costs.14 We assume that a firm 
incurs no additional cost to implement its production technology at home, implying that there is 
no efficiency loss, dii = 1. 
 As in Melitz (2003), each firm receives a random productivity draw from a Pareto 
distribution. Then, a measure of potential producers with efficiency of at least z is: 
μ୧
ZሺZ ൒ zሻ ൌ T୧zିθ,   z ൐ 0       (2) 
Ti indicates the average level of efficiency/technology in country i, and θ  governs the 
distribution of firm-level productivities, which is assumed constant across countries. Since all 
goods are uniquely produced by a single firm and differ solely in the dimension of productivity, 
the terms “goods” and “firm” can be indexed interchangeably. As equation (1) leads to 
ݖ௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ݓ௡݀௡௜ ܿ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ⁄ , the following equation describes the measure of goods that can be 
produced in country n by firms from country i with unit cost less than ܿ: 
                                                  
13 The efficiency loss of offshore production is similar in interpretation to Keller and Yeaple (2008), 
showing that complex technologies deter multinational production from imports by multinational 
parent firms. It is also consistent with the findings in Ramondo (2011) and Ramondo and 
Rodriguez-Clare (2009) that multinational costs increase with distance, language barriers, and 
national borders. Also, intra-firm trade is an alternative explanation for variable costs in 
multinational production (Irarrazabal et al. 2010). 
14 FDI policy restrictions may increase the costs of multinationals operating abroad in terms of 
ownership constraints, foreign-specific regulations, and weak legal protection of property and capital 
(World Bank Group, 2010). 
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ߤ௡௜ሺܥ ൑ ܿሻ ൌ ߤ௜
௭ ቀ௪೙ௗ೙೔
௖
ቁ.        (3) 
Using equation (2), we can write equation (3) as ߤ௜௭ ቀ
௪೙ௗ೙೔
௖
ቁ ൌ ௜ܶሺݓ௡݀௡௜ሻିఏሺܿሻఏ. 
 
3.2 Demand and Entry Costs 
 With constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) preferences, each country has the following 
demand function for differentiated products: 
ܺ௡ሺ݆ሻ ൌ  ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ ቀ
௣೙ሺ௝ሻ
௉೙
ቁ
ିሺఙିଵሻ
ܺ௡        (4) 
where ܺ௡ሺ݆ሻ is the quantity sold by firm j in country n, Xn is an aggregate demand for 
manufacturing varieties, and ௡ܲ is the CES price index averaged across all goods consumed in 
country n. ߪ is the elasticity of substitution between any two goods with ߪ  ൐ 1, for which it is 
assumed ߠ െ 1 ൐ ߪ. ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ is an unobservable demand shock for firm j selling in country n, 
with higher values indicating a preferable shock to a variety produced by firm j. 
 A firm j enters market n by paying a fixed cost of setting up a production plant as follows:15 
ܧ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ܧ௡௜ߝ௡ሺ݆ሻ        (5) 
where ܧ௡௜ is a general fixed cost that is constant for all firms entering market n from country i. 
The costs include the physical costs of building a plant and the information/FDI barrier costs 
associated with establishing a new affiliate in a new market. The information costs are related to 
marketing research, foreign contacts, and local recruitment of workers. FDI policy barriers in 
the form of fixed costs may include additional regulations required to set up an affiliate. ߝ௡ሺ݆ሻ 
is a idiosyncratic fixed cost specific to firm j entering market n, which accounts for 
unobservable factors of fixed costs. Higher values indicate larger investment costs for firm j to 
enter market n. 
 A firm j from country i operating in market n will generate net profits as: 
                                                  
15 EKK (2011) employ the marketing-based formulation of fixed costs in Arkolakis (2010) to 
account for an increasing fixed cost with the sales size. We first estimated such a form of entry 
condition, but found that the fixed entry cost is not quantitatively dependent on the sales size. 
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ߨ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ   ቀ1 െ
௖೙೔ሺ௝ሻ
௣೙ሺ௝ሻ
ቁ ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ ቀ
௣೙ሺ௝ሻ
௉೙
ቁ
ିሺఙିଵሻ
ܺ௡ െ ܧ௡௜ߝ௡ሺ݆ሻ   (6) 
With monopolistic competition and Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, each firm maximizes its profit by 
charging a constant markup ഥ݉ ൌ ߪ ሺߪ െ 1ሻ⁄  over its unit cost, ܿ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ, such that ݌௡ሺ݆ሻ ൌ
ഥ݉ܿ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ. Then, its total gross profit is proportional to demand with a factor of 1/ߪ, yielding 
ܺ௡ሺ݆ሻ/ߪ. Firm j will enter market n if and only if its operating profit is sufficient to overcome 
the fixed cost of entry: 
ߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ ቀ
௣೙ሺ௝ሻ
௉೙
ቁ
ିሺఙିଵሻ ௑೙
ఙ
൒ ܧ௡௜       (7) 
where ߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ ൌ  ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ  ߝ௡ሺ݆ሻൗ  is an entry shock to firm j that invests in market n.  
 
3.3 Entry and Sales Conditions 
 The condition in equation (7) can be used to express the entry hurdle condition that firm j 
enters market n from country i if and only if its unit cost is less than the threshold entry cost: 
ܿ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൑ ܿҧ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ         (8) 
where: 
ܿҧ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ቀߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ
௑೙
ఙா೙೔
ቁ
ଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ ௉೙
௠ഥ
      (9) 
Substituting the constant markup price and equation (9) into equation (4), we can express the 
latent sales conditional on entry: 
ܺ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ
ఈ೙ሺ௝ሻ
ఎ೙ሺ௝ሻ
 ߪܧ௡௜ ቀ
௖ҧ೙೔ሺ௝ሻ
௖೙ሺ௝ሻ
ቁ
ఙିଵ
      (10) 
 Equations (8), (9), and (10) provide the main theoretical predictions about the structure of 
heterogeneous multinational firms with varying efficiency. The entry hurdle in (9), ܿҧ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ, pins 
down the critical threshold for entry, whereby a lower ܿҧ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ indicates that the market is less 
attractive for firms to engage in multinational production. As unit cost decreases with firm-level 
productivity, more efficient firms are more likely than less efficient firms to overcome the entry 
hurdle. Conditional on entry, equation (10) dictates the volume of sales generated by firm j in 
13 
 
that market. 
 Analogous to the behavior of exporting firms found in EKK, the model then predicts that 
higher productivity firms are more likely than less productive firms to: (i) invest in a larger 
number of markets, (ii) penetrate the less attractive markets, and (iii) yield larger sales per 
market. With varying entry hurdles, firms first enter the most attractive market, and then invest 
progressively in less attractive markets, predicting a hierarchy of market destinations in which 
more productive firms progressively enter less attractive markets. However, the presence of 
entry and demand shocks in the model allows firms with identical productivity to deviate from 
identical patterns of market entry and volume of affiliate sales. Thus, the model predicts a weak 
pecking order. 
 
3.4 Empirical Regularities of Japanese Multinational Production 
 Since we apply the EKK model of trade to FDI, it is necessary to examine whether 
empirical regularities of multinational activities are consistent with the model, as is found in 
exporting firm data. Using Japanese firm-level data of multinational entry and sales across 
foreign markets, we document a number of the stylized patterns in line with the theoretical 
implications of the EKK model. 
 
Market Entry and Market Size 
 Figure 1 shows a relationship between market entry and market size. Panel A plots the 
number of parent firms investing in each market against the market size, as measured in real 
GDP in billions of 2000 U.S. dollars.16 The number of firms investing in each market increases 
with the size of the host market. Panel B shows the average sales of foreign affiliates in each 
market against the market size. Sales per affiliate increase with the market size, as is consistent 
with the number of investing parent firms. Thus, larger markets may attract the entry of more 
                                                  
16 Data on real GDP come from the World Development Indicators. 
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multinational firms, but have a weaker positive impact on average affiliate sales. The patterns 
observed in Panel A and Panel B can be well explained by the existence of fixed entry costs. 
 
=== Figure 1 === 
Sales Distributions 
 Figure 2 plots the sales distributions of Japanese firms within individual markets. For the 
Japanese market, firm size is measured by domestic production that aggregates firms’ sales in 
Japan and their export markets. We normalize each firm’s sales relative to the mean of domestic 
sales and compute a fraction of firms with at least that much sales.17 For other foreign markets, 
we use the total sales of foreign affiliates, including their sales to local, home, and third markets. 
Figure 2 shows a plot of the normalized sales and the fraction of firms for Japan, China, the 
U.S., and Thailand. The shapes of the sales distributions are similar across markets and closely 
following a linear line in the upper tail, supporting the assumption that underlying firm-level 
productivity of multinational sales is Pareto distributed. However, the distribution starts to 
deviate from a linear line in the lower tail. As argued by EKK, the deviations in the lower tail 
can be partly explained by market-entry shocks. 
 
=== Figure 2 === 
Market Entry and Sales in Japan 
 Figure 3 describes the relationship between market entry and sales in Japan. We group 
firms into different sets according to their entry to foreign markets. First, Japanese firms are 
sorted into the set of firms with the minimum number of foreign markets they penetrated. Panel 
A in Figure 3 plots the average sales in Japan for each set of firms investing in at least m 
markets or more. Sales in Japan rise monotonically with the number of markets where 
multinationals own an affiliate. Second, firms are grouped by the number of markets they 
                                                  
17 The fraction is constructed by dividing (rank – 0.5) by the total number of firms/affiliates for each 
observation in a given market, where the rank is one for a firm/affiliate with the largest sales. 
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entered. Panel B presents a plot of average sales in Japan against the number of firms investing 
in m markets or more, with the marker indicating the number of markets they served. For the set 
of firms penetrating a single market, there are over 1000 firms with relatively low average sales 
in Japan. As the number of markets served by them increases, the set of these firms becomes 
smaller with higher levels of sales. Figure 3 identifies a significant link between domestic sales 
and market entry, indicating that larger firms are more likely than smaller firms to invest in a 
larger number of markets. This pattern is consistent with the productivity sorting pattern found 
in heterogeneous firm exporting decisions across multiple markets, highlighting the critical role 
of productivity in self-selection decisions of FDI activity. 
 
=== Figure 3 === 
Multinational Production Intensity 
 Lastly, Figure 4 describes the relationship between sales in Japan and foreign affiliate sales. 
We compute the normalized sales of foreign affiliates in each market defined by 
൫X୬Jሺjሻ Xഥ୬J⁄ ൯ ൫XJሺjሻ XഥJ⁄ ൯ൗ . To remove the market effect, firm j’s sales in market n are divided by 
the average sales in that market, and then are further divided by the normalized sales in market J, 
Japan, to remove the firm-size effect. The figure plots the 90th percentile and median normalized 
sales of foreign affiliates against the number of parent firms for each market. Normalized 
affiliate sales increase with the popularity of foreign markets as measured by the number of firm 
entry. However, the pattern is noisier for the markets in which less than 10 firms entered. The 
generally positive relationship suggests that fixed costs alone cannot explain the varying levels 
of multinational participation and point to the existence of variable FDI costs such as costly 
technology transfer. 
 
=== Figure 4 === 
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4. Estimation and Model Validation 
 In this section we estimate the structural parameters of the model and evaluate the model’s 
ability to replicate real multinational activity. Before presenting the results, we briefly review 
the estimation strategy and simulation procedure for individual multinational firms. Because we 
closely follow the framework developed by EKK (2011), we describe details of the estimation 
framework in Appendix. 
 
4.1 Respecification for Simulation 
 Following EKK (2011), we re-specify the entry and sales conditions in equations (8), (9), 
and (10) for quantification. We first isolate the heterogeneous component of unit costs by 
defining ݑሺݏሻ ൌ ௃ܶݖ௃ሺݏሻିఏ as the standardized unit costs for a Japanese firm J. Redefining the 
efficiency of potential producer in Japan in terms of standardized unit cost for firm j, we arrive 
at: 
ݑሺ݆ሻ ൌ ௃ܶݖ௃ሺ݆ሻିఏ         (11) 
where J denotes Japan as a home country. Second, the country-level parameters in equations (9) 
and (10) are connected with the total number of foreign entries ௡ܰ௃ and FDI shares ܺ௡௃/ܺ௡, 
respectively. We can then express the entry hurdle as: 
ݑሺ݆ሻ ൑ ݑത௡௃൫ߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ൯ ൌ ߢଶ ௡ܰ௃ߟ௡ሺ݆ሻఏ
෩       (12) 
where 
                               ߠ෨  ൌ   ఏ
ఙିଵ
൐ 1 
                               ߢଶ ൌ ׬ߟఏ
෩ ݃ଶሺߟሻ݀ߟ. 
Note that ݑത௡൫ߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ൯ is a standardized entry hurdle in market n for potential producer j from 
Japan. ߠ෨ is observed heterogeneity in sales, with a lower value indicating a larger dispersion in 
sales. Conditional on entry, the sales condition for firm j in market n is given by: 
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ܺ௡௃ሺ݆ሻ ൌ
ఈ೙ሺ௝ሻ
ఎ೙ሺ௝ሻ
Xഥ௡௃
఑మ
఑భ
ቀ߭௡௃ሺ݆ሻቁ
ିଵ
ఏ෩ൗ        (13) 
where: 
                      ߢଵ ൌ ߢ଴׭ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻߟ௡ሺ݆ሻሺఏ
෩ିଵሻ ݃ሺߙ, ߟሻ݀ߙ݀ߟ 
                      ߢ଴ ൌ
ఏ෩
ఏ෩ିଵ
.18 
߭௡௃ሺ݆ሻ ൌ
௨ሺ௝ሻ
௨ഥ೙಻൫ఎ೙ሺ௝ሻ൯
 follows a uniform distribution on ሾ0, 1ሿ.  
 To parameterize ߢଵ and ߢଶ, ݃ሺߙ, ߟሻ is assumed to be joint lognormal, with variances (ߪఈ 
and ߪఎ), and correlation ߩ. The joint lognormal distribution allows us to write ߢଵ and ߢଶ as 
follows: 
ߢଵ ൌ ቂ
ఏ෩
ఏ෩ିଵ
ቃ ݁ݔ݌ ቈ
ఙഀାଶఘఙഀఙആ൫ఏ෩ିଵ൯ାఙആ൫ఏ෩ିଵ൯
మ
ଶ
቉   (14) 
ߢଶ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ ቈ
൫ఏ෩ఙആ൯
మ
ଶ
቉         (15) 
4.2 Estimation Procedure 
 Taken together, the entry and sales conditions are governed by four structural parameters: 
heterogeneity in observed sales ߠ෨, variance in sales ߪఈ, variance in entry shocks ߪఎ, and 
correlation ߩ. We denote the set of these structural parameters by: 
Θ ൌ ሺߠ෨, ߪఈ, ߪఎ, ߩሻ 
Comparing moments of the simulated and actual datasets on multinational firms, we search for 
an optimal set of structural parameters via the simulated method of moments.  
 In the first step of this estimation procedure, we use the entry and sales conditions in 
equations (12) and (13) to simulate individual multinational activities. An artificial producer, s, 
is generated by its efficiency draw, ݑሺݏሻ, sales shock, ߙ௡ሺݏሻ, and entry shock ߟ௡ሺݏሻ. With an 
initial guess for the structural parameters and aggregate data, we can produce a dataset of 
artificial multinational firms with varying productivity and the location and sales of their foreign 
                                                  
18 Refer to the derivation of the price index in the Appendix A. 
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affiliates. 
 In the second step, we construct a set of moment conditions from simulated multinationals 
and actual Japanese multinationals. We define a vector of deviations between actual and 
artificial moments for outcome k: 
ݕሺΘሻ ൌ ݉௞ െ ෝ݉௞ሺΘሻ.       (17) 
Following the theoretical implications of the model, we choose four moment conditions: 
pecking order strings, affiliate sales distributions across markets, parent sales distribution in 
Japan, and multinational production intensity.  
 We seek to capture these patterns that were identified in the empirical regularities of 
Japanese firms. Specifically, the pecking order strings are defined as a group of multinational 
firms entering each possible combination of the five most popular countries in terms of 
multinational entry: China, United States, Thailand, Taiwan, and Indonesia in 2006. Next, the 
distribution of affiliate sales is a group of multinationals investing in each foreign market and 
belonging to the actual sales percentiles for q = 50th, 75th, 100th. Then, the distribution of 
multinational parent sales in Japan is a group of multinationals entering each foreign market and 
belonging to the percentiles of actual sales in Japan for q = 50th, 75th, 100th. Finally, the 
multinational production intensity is a group of multinationals whose ratio of sales in market n 
to sales in Japan is below and above the 50th percentile for each market.  
 Finally, we estimate a set of structural parameters that match the simulated moments as 
closely as possible with moments from the actual data. Stacking a vector of moment conditions, 
we minimize the objective function: 
Θ෡ ൌ argminΘ൛ሾ݉௞ െ ෝ݉௞ሺΘሻሿ′  ሾ݉௞ െ ෝ݉௞ሺΘሻሿ ൟ.     (18) 
 
4.3 Estimation Results 
 Table 3 presents the estimation results of the structural parameters with bootstrapped 
standard errors. In column (1), we report the benchmark results. To mitigate the chance that 
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noisier segments of the data adversely influence the estimates, we exclude markets with less 
than 10 foreign affiliates from the estimation. We find that the key distribution parameter of size 
dispersion, ߠ෨ ൌ ߠ ሺߪ െ 1ሻ⁄ , is 1.9. This estimate is slightly lower than EKK’s estimate of 2.46 
for French exporting firms, indicating that Japanese multinationals may have a greater 
dispersion in sales than French exporting firms do. Given that our estimates are generated from 
multinational, not exporting, activities, the parameter estimates are not strictly comparable. 
Nevertheless, it is reassuring that our estimate for firm heterogeneity is quantitatively similar to 
the estimate of French exporters found by EKK.19 
 We find that the estimate of variance in sales shock is 1.64, which is quite similar in 
magnitude to the corresponding estimate for French exporters. The estimate of variance in entry 
shock is 0.39, which is also quantitatively close to the corresponding estimate of 0.34 for French 
exporters. While there is no clear reference to interpret the size of these estimates, these results 
indicate that heterogeneity in productivity is not sufficient to account for the entry and sales 
patterns of actual Japanese multinationals. Comparing the variances of entry and sales shocks, 
we find that the model is more effective at explaining variations in market entry than variations 
in foreign affiliate sales. Lastly, we find that the correlation between entry and sales shocks is 
–0.62, suggesting that the entry shocks are negatively associated with the sales shocks. 
=== Table 3 === 
 We proceed to check the robustness of the benchmark estimates. First, a possible concern is 
that the exclusion of smaller markets could influence the benchmark estimates. Estimating the 
parameters for all the markets, we present the results in column (2). The results show that the 
estimate for size dispersion rises to 2.12, but the overall point estimate and bootstrapped 
standard errors are quite similar to the benchmark. Second, we check the sensitivity of the 
                                                  
19 The level of size dispersion is related to heterogeneity in firm efficiency via an elasticity of 
substitution. As Kang (2008) estimates that the elasticity of substation is 2.19 for the Japanese 
manufacturing sector in 1994-2004, a rough estimate of efficiency dispersion from our estimated 
parameter is 2.37. By contrast, Wakasugi et al. (2008) find that the dispersion parameter of total 
factor productivity was 1.69 for Japanese manufacturing firms in 2003. 
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benchmark parameters to a different set of moments. Among the moments used, the pecking 
order of entry may not fit as well for multinational production compared to export entry because 
FDI activity is encouraged by a multitude of investment motives, including market access, 
efficiency seeking, and policy incentives. To address this concern, we exclude the pecking order 
moments from the estimation. Column (3) shows that the estimated parameters and 
bootstrapped standard errors are similar to the benchmark results, suggesting that our results are 
robust to the different set of moments used.  
 Finally, we estimate the structural parameters for Japanese multinational activity in 1996. 
Column (4) shows that the estimate of size dispersion rises to 2.13, but the difference falls 
within the range of the bootstrapped standard errors from the benchmark result. While the other 
estimates differ slightly from the benchmark estimates, there is no substantial deviation. Taken 
together, our robustness checks demonstrate that the benchmark estimates of the four parameters 
are not sensitive to alternative specifications of the sample and the moments used for estimation. 
 
4.4 Model Validation 
 Having checked the robustness of key structural parameters, we proceed to examine how 
well the estimated model performs in replicating real multinational activity. First, we assess the 
model’s ability to replicate the actual data as captured by our moment conditions. Given the 
estimated parameters, we simulate multinational activity and compare the simulated moments 
with the moments from the estimation sample. In results not shown, we find a good fit of the 
data between simulated and actual moments, suggesting that the model is able to closely 
replicate the in-sample moments of the actual data.20 As the same sample is used for both 
estimation and validation, the exercise is a conventional internal model validation test.  
 Since in-sample replications are based only on the information conditioned in the 
estimation of structural parameters, the internal validation test does not clearly show the 
                                                  
20 Refer to section 6 in Arita and Tanaka (2011). 
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model’s ability to predict multinational activity in an environment with a significantly different 
level of FDI barriers. To gain further confidence that the model can be used to simulate 
multinational activity when FDI barriers change, we examine the external validity of the model. 
We make use of data from a decade earlier on Japanese multinationals, and investigate how well 
the model is able to reproduce out-of-sample predictions of Japanese multinational activities in 
1996 with our parameters estimated on 2006 decade. Using 1996 data to parameterize ௡ܰ௃ and 
Xഥ௡௃, we simulate an artificial set of multinationals from the entry and sales conditions: 
ݑሺݏሻ ൑ ݑത௡൫ߟ௡ሺݏሻ൯ ൌ ௡ܰ௃
ଵଽଽ଺ߢଶߟ௡ሺݏሻఏ
෩      (19) 
ܺ௡௃ሺݏሻ ൌ Xഥ௡௃
ଵଽଽ଺ ఈ೙ሺ௦ሻ
ఎ೙ሺ௦ሻ
఑మ
఑భ
ቀ ௨
ሺ௦ሻ
௨ഥ೙ሺ௦ሻ
ቁ
ିଵ
ఏ෩ൗ .      (20) 
Because FDI barriers were likely to change significantly from 1996 to 2006, this external 
validation approach is in the spirit of the “non-random holdout sample” (Keane and Wolpin, 
2007). That is, we assess a model fit by asking how well the model can replicate multinational 
activity outside the support of the data along the dimension that the model is meant to predict, 
i.e., changes in FDI barriers. 
 Figures 5.1 and 5.2 present the out-of-sample simulations for 1996 activity. The figures are 
scatter plots of the number of simulated firms vs. the actual number of firms according to the 
bins defined by the moment conditions estimated in the model. Panel A presents the number of 
firms falling into each of the 32 pecking order strings for the real and simulated data. Panels B 
through D present the number of firms falling into the defined percentile groups across foreign 
markets of each respective moment. A 45-degree straight line is plotted as a reference to indicate 
a perfect fit between simulated and actual firms.  
From Panels A through D, we find that the model fit is considerably strong along various 
dimensions of multinational activities. The good fit is evident from the four moments: pecking 
order strings, distribution of foreign affiliate sales across markets, distribution of sales back in 
Japan, and multinational production intensities. However, we tend to slightly under-simulate 
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sales of foreign affiliates and domestic sales in Japan.21 Although the out-of-sample predictions 
reveal slight deviations from the data, the overall simulations are externally consistent with the 
Japanese multinational activity a decade ago.22 This gives us some degree of confidence that 
the model can be used to simulate multinational activity under reduced FDI barriers. 
=== Figures 5.1 and 5.2 === 
 
5. Counterfactual Analysis 
Internal and external model validation provides a degree of confidence that the model can 
be used to simulate multinational activity under falling FDI barriers. In this section, we use the 
model to perform counterfactual simulations to investigate the impacts of changes in FDI barriers 
on intra-industry reallocations and the implications for aggregate productivity.  
 
5.1   Global General Equilibrium 
 For counterfactuals, we first need to account for adjustments of aggregate prices and wages 
that take place following an exogenous change in variable and fixed FDI barriers. Leaving details 
of the general equilibrium setting and data sources in Appendix D, we briefly summarize the 
counterfactual simulation procedure. 
 Following the approach in EKK (2011), we first set up a general equilibrium framework in 
which producers serve their home and host countries through FDI. Each country is endowed 
with labor, which is mobile within countries, but immobile across countries. Intermediates are a 
Cobb-Douglas combination of labor and intermediates. Final output is non-traded and a 
Cobb-Douglas combination of manufactures and labor. Fixed cost for FDI is paid by labor. 
                                                  
21 In comparison with in-sample predictions for 2006 activity, the predictive ability of the model 
appears to be slightly weaker in out-of-sample predictions for 1996 activity (Arita and Tanaka, 
2011). 
22 We also found some shortcomings of the model. First, large firms tend to invest in too many 
countries, but small firms invest in too few. Second, we tend to under-simulate the sales level of 
Japanese multinationals in both home and foreign markets. Lastly, the model poorly explains 
vertically motivated multinationals. 
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Profits accrue to the headquarter country of producers. As consumers own equal shares of each 
firm headquartered in their country, the profits are redistributed equally among the consumers. A 
country’s GDP is equal to its total wage from production in its own country and its total profit 
from abroad. Lastly, some countries are net receivers for FDI, and we allow for FDI deficits.23 
 The general equilibrium framework is set up such that manufacturing production and 
consumption across countries are connected through FDI activity. Equilibrium in the world 
market for manufacturers leads to a system of equations. Based on the approach of Dekle, et al. 
(2008), changes in wages and prices can be solved as a result of an exogenous change in 
variable and fixed FDI costs. By solving changes in prices and wages jointly, we can calculate 
counterfactual changes across countries in FDI sales from Japan and the entry number of 
Japanese firms, ෠ܺ௡௃஼  and ෡ܰ௡௃஼ . 
 Given the counterfactual changes in aggregate sales and entry from Japan to other countries, 
we can calculate the expected changes in the aggregate sales and entry. Then, we use the entry 
and sales conditions in equations (12) and (13) to specify the corresponding counterfactual 
conditions: 
ݑሺݏሻ ൑ ݑത௡௃
஼ ൫ߟ௡ሺݏሻ൯ ൌ ௡ܰ௃
஼ ఎ೙ሺ௦ሻ
ഇ෩
఑మ
          (21) 
ܺ௡௃
஼ ሺݏሻ ൌ Xഥ௡௃
஼ ሺݏሻ ఈ೙
ሺ௝ሻ
ఎ೙ሺ௝ሻ
఑మ
఑భ
ቀ ௨
ሺ௦ሻ
௨ഥ೙
಴ሺ௦ሻ
ቁ
ିଵ
ఏ෩ൗ          (22) 
Holding the structural parameters fixed, we next simulate a set of artificial firms on the basis 
of equations (21) and (22), generating a counterfactual dataset of multinational entry and sales. 
For our counterfactual simulations, we fix productivity draws and entry and sales shocks specific 
to individual firms in order to ensure that all changes in firm-level activity relative to the baseline 
stem solely from a change in FDI barriers.  
For our analysis, a hypothetical experiment should provide a useful insight into the response 
of individual firms to aggregate shocks. However, it should be emphasized that the model is 
                                                  
23 FDI deficits are fixed to their 2006 levels in counterfactuals. 
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based on a set of highly stylized assumptions. As emphasized in counterfactual exercises by 
Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Chor (2010), counterfactuals should not be interpreted definitely, 
but should be viewed as an explorative investigation. 
 
5.2 Global Reductions in FDI Barriers 
 In our first experiment, we examine the impacts of a 20% global reduction in both variable 
and fixed FDI barriers by applying an exogenous change in the variable costs, መ݀௡௜ ൌ 1/1.20, 
and that in the fixed costs, ܧ෠௡௜ ൌ 1/1.20, for all ݊ ് ݅. These reductions can be interpreted as a 
decline in the variable and fixed costs of manufacturing production abroad, which result from 
advances in communication and transportation technology and continued multilateral 
liberalization of FDI policy restrictions. Production barriers within a country are assumed to 
remain unchanged by setting መ݀௜௜ ൌ 1 and ܧ෠௜௜ ൌ 1. We first present counterfactual changes at 
the aggregate level and then the changes that occur at the firm level.  
 Column (1) in Table 4.1 presents the general equilibrium changes for real wages at the 
aggregate level. We find that falling FDI barriers lead to a general increase in real wages around 
the world (approximately 29%). This result is generated by two forces. First, foreign affiliate 
expansion by multinationals leads to a rise in income around the world due to the extra income 
that their headquarters country receives from higher profits generated from multinational 
activity abroad. Second, the increased production reduces the aggregate price level because 
more efficient multinational firms produce at lower marginal costs. Specifically, the countries 
that are more open to FDI such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Belgium, would experience a 
larger increase in inward multinational activity, and receive greater welfare gains in terms of a 
steeper decline in prices and a more dramatic increase in real wages. On the other hand, the 
countries that have higher levels of outward FDI such as Japan, the United States, and 
Netherlands, may experience a modest increase in prices because of the increased wealth effects 
from multinational profits generated abroad. Thus, they receive smaller welfare gains in terms of 
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a modest decline in prices and a modest increase in wages. In the case of Japan, small inward 
FDI and large outward FDI combine to yield a modest 0.7% increase in real wages. 
===Table 4.1=== 
 With the general equilibrium changes in wages and prices, we can predict aggregate changes 
in entry and sales by Japanese firms across foreign markets and in Japan. Columns (2) and (3) in 
Table 4.1 show that Japanese firms increase their entry and sales in the majority of foreign 
markets. On average, the entry of Japanese firms increases by 72.5% and their sales rise by 
103.4%. However, these changes differ significantly across markets. As falling inward barriers 
raise competition in the Japanese home market through lower aggregate prices, Japanese firms 
decrease in number by 2.7% and reduce their aggregate domestic production by 3.5%. By 
contrast, falling outward barriers lead to foreign expansion by Japanese firms.  
Table 4.2 presents the results for the aggregate number and production of Japanese firms 
according to these aggregate changes around the world. Multinational firms increase in number 
by 66.4% and expand their aggregate foreign production by 107.3%. Because foreign expansion 
dominates domestic contraction, the total volume of domestic and foreign production increases 
by 18.9%. Thus, our simulations show that falling FDI barriers abroad lead to a significant 
restructuring of the economy from domestic to multinational production. 
===Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4=== 
 Simulating individual firm activity, we then dissect how falling FDI barriers affect firms 
differently according to productivity levels. Table 4.3 shows the counterfactual results for 
changes in the number of total firms and multinational firms, i.e., the extensive margin, across 
productivity decile groups. Due to high fixed entry costs in foreign markets, most firms in the 
lowest decile group are domestic whereas most multinational firms belong to the higher 
productivity groups. Falling investment barriers induce 1,004 domestic firms to become 
multinational: 176 from firms below the 50th percentile in terms of productivity and 828 firms 
with productivity above the 50th percentile. There is no growth at the extensive margin for the 
26 
 
top 1% firms as they all are already multinational in the baseline. Furthermore, the increased 
competition from abroad leads to an exit of 350 domestic firms, which are concentrated in the 
bottom 10% decile group with a net exit rate of 25%.  
These asymmetric changes along the extensive margin highlight the important role of fixed 
costs in multinational production and the self-selection decision to enter foreign markets. When 
fixed barriers fall, the impact at the extensive-margin is pronounced for those firms closest to the 
threshold productivity prior to the change. If fixed costs are sufficiently high, falling barriers will 
more likely provide foreign production opportunities for higher productivity firms. In addition, 
among potential producers below the cutoff productivity, higher productivity firms tend to 
overcome entry barriers across a larger number of markets.  
 Table 4.4 presents the changes in domestic and total production per firm and foreign 
production per multinational, i.e., the intensive margin. Falling inward barriers lead to the entry 
of foreign firms to the domestic market, and increased competition at home leads to an 
across-the-board reduction in the average domestic production. In contrast, falling outward 
barriers lead to a rise in foreign production per multinational firm across all firms, whereby 
intensive margin growth is significantly higher for higher productivity firms. Firms below the 
70th percentile grow by less than 2 billion yen (or 3% of their total production), while the top 
1% grow by 486.6 billion yen (or 57% of their total production). Because the intensive margin 
of foreign production increases modestly for firms below the 70th percentile, the average total 
production for low productivity firms decreases by 0.9 - 2.5%. In contrast, total production per 
firm increases for firms in the upper percentile groups, with an extremely large expansion for 
the top 1% of firms by 481.3 trillion or 56.3% of their total sales.  
  The decrease in variable costs yields asymmetric impacts along the intensive margin. A 
percentage decline in variable costs translates into a disproportionate increase in the volume of 
sales for firms that have larger foreign production across markets. For firms below the 70th 
percentile that generate less than 0.1% of all their sales abroad, the impacts of falling barriers on 
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total production growth are small, contributing to a less than 0.9% increase in total sales. This 
contrasts with the firms above the 70th percentile that generate more than 50% of their sales 
abroad; falling barriers contribute to a more than 30% increase in their overall sales. These more 
productive firms penetrate a larger number of markets and yield greater sales per market, 
magnifying the overall scale effect.   
The asymmetric changes at the extensive and intensive margins lead to significant 
intra-industry reallocation of market shares across firms. By calculating the percentage share of 
production according to quintile productivity groups, we depict the market shares in baseline 
and counterfactual simulations in Figure 6. Prior to any reduction in investment barriers, the 
baseline production structure is already heavily skewed—the top quintile of firms account for 
56.6% of production. Following a 20% reduction in variable and fixed FDI barriers, the market 
share of this group increases to 64.5% while the remaining bottom firms lose market share. 
=== Figure 6=== 
 This reallocation from less to more productive firms may lead to large aggregate 
productivity gains. To quantify productivity improvements, we adopt the productivity 
decomposition approach of Foster et al. (2001). Specifically, we calculate the following 
components of aggregate productivity changes: 
∑ lnሺݖ௦ሻ∆ܹ݄݁݅݃ݐ௦௦           (23) 
∑ ܹ݄݁݅݃ݐ௦௦ ൣln൫ݖ௘௫௜௧_௦ሻ െ ln ሺݖ௦ሻതതതതതതതത൯൧       (24) 
where Weights is the output share of simulated firm s in the total production of all firms, ݖ௦ is a 
measure of the simulated firm’s efficiency, and ln ሺݖ௦ሻതതതതതതതത is the average efficiency level of the 
industry. Compared with the standard decomposition technique, our model does not allow for 
within-firm technology improvement. If we assume that firm productivity is identified solely by 
its efficiency draw z, then, the above two measures can be used to assess aggregate productivity 
changes stemming from the intra-industry reallocations. We find that a 20% reduction in FDI 
barriers translates into an approximate 29.6% gain from market-share reallocations and a 1.2% 
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gain from the exit effects. Together, aggregate productivity improves by 30.7%. 
It is important to note that these aggregate productivity gains are primarily realized from 
expanding multinational production in Japan’s investment partners, rather than in its domestic 
industry. Thus, it is more appropriate to attribute our measured productivity improvements to 
reallocations of Japanese technological resources abroad, of which gains are realized at the global, 
rather than domestic, level. 
 
5.3 Variable vs. Fixed FDI Barriers 
 We now examine more closely the different consequences between reductions in variable 
and fixed FDI barriers on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate productivity changes. For 
this task, we run counterfactual simulations for (1) a 20% global decline in strictly variable FDI 
barriers, and (2) a 20% global decline in strictly fixed FDI barriers. These comparisons allow us 
to explicitly examine the impacts between variable and fixed FDI barriers.  
 Before presenting the results, we clarify the distinction between variable and fixed costs for 
FDI activity. Variable costs are associated with technology/management efficiency losses, 
transaction costs, and policy factors such as foreign taxes. The model predicts that falling 
variable costs reduce the unit cost of foreign production for each firm, which increases the 
probability for firms to enter a market and expands their production there. On the other hand, 
fixed costs capture the establishment costs of offshore production, including plant construction, 
information, and network costs to set up a foreign affiliate. A decline in the fixed costs 
encourages a firm to overcome the entry hurdle in a market. Beyond any secondary effects on 
the price level, falling fixed barriers are related to the intensive margin of multinational sales 
through the sales condition. 
 Table 5.1 reports the aggregate outcomes from reducing variable and fixed barriers, 
separately. The total number of firms declines by 2.21% for the variable barriers and by 1.53% 
for the fixed barriers, suggesting that variable costs have a larger impact. In contrast, fixed costs 
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have a slightly higher impact on multinational firms than variable costs; multinationals increase 
in number by 28.6% for fixed costs and by 25.2% for variable costs. This suggests that fixed 
costs play an important role in accounting for the entry of multinationals. In terms of the volume 
of production, the variable costs have a significantly stronger impact than the fixed cost. Foreign 
production increases by 59.1% for the former and by 27.2% for the latter. Reductions in variable 
barriers leads to an increase in foreign competition, whereby domestic production contracts by 
0.74% for the variable barriers. In the case of reducing fixed barriers, the wealth effects from 
increased Japanese multinational profits generated abroad dominate the pro-competitive effects 
of increased inward foreign multinational production, leading to an increase in domestic 
production by 0.28%. Together, the expansion of total production is larger from falling variable 
barriers. 
=== Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3=== 
 Table 5.2 reports the counterfactual changes along the extensive margin across productivity 
decile groups. We find that reduced fixed barriers induce 455 additional firms to become 
multinational, while reduced variable barriers induce 415 additional firms to invest abroad. This 
suggests that fixed entry costs play a larger role in the extensive margin of FDI. Once again 
these impacts are more pronounced for higher productivity firms than lower productivity firms.   
Table 5.3 reports the changes along the intensive margin. In terms of foreign production, we 
find that falling variable barriers induce the top 1% of firms to increase their intensive margin by 
314.8 billion yen, and by 82.5 billion yen in the case of fixed barriers. Thus, relative to 
reductions in fixed barriers, reductions in variable barriers yield more dramatic growth along the 
intensive margin of multinational production.24 Overall we find a larger reallocation of total 
production for variable barriers relative to changes in fixed barriers. 
                                                  
24 Reductions in variable inward barriers lead to a reduction in average domestic production across 
all firms except for the lowest decile group which increases because of exiting by the smallest firms. 
While all firms decrease domestic production, due to the disproportionate exiting of small firms, 
there is an increase in average domestic production of all firms. With wealth effects, the reductions 
in fixed barriers lead to an increase in domestic production for all firms.  
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As variable investment barriers fall, the most productive firms expand their market share 
progressively, which in turn yields an increasing level of reallocation effects. By contrast, an 
increase in productivity gains is modest for declining fixed barriers, which have a stronger 
impact on the extensive margin than the intensive margin. Because changes along the 
extensive-margin generate a weak expansionary effect on the incumbent multinational firms, 
there would be a small contribution of the reallocation effects to aggregate productivity 
improvements. To clarify this point, Figure 7 shows the counterfactual changes in market shares 
from falling variable and fixed barriers as compared with the baseline. It is evident that variable 
barriers lead to a larger reallocation of market share from less to more productive firms. 
=== Figure 7 and 8=== 
  Assessing the impact of these reallocations on aggregate productivity, we find that falling 
variable barriers lead to an approximate 17.3% improvement in aggregate productivity. By 
contrast, falling fixed costs lead to a much smaller improvement of 4.5%. Figure 8 plots the 
simulated gains in aggregate productivity from varying the level of changes in variable and fixed 
levels of FDI barriers. The simulations indicate that aggregate productivity improvements are 
driven by reductions in variable FDI barriers as is in line with the findings for exporting firms in 
di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010). Previous studies on gains from FDI have not explicitly 
distinguished between these types of barriers. Our numerical results demonstrate the importance 
of modeling each type of barriers as they carry substantially different quantitative implications for 
aggregate productivity improvements. 
 
5.3 Discussion 
Our simulations present the first attempt to explicitly quantify the intra-industry reallocations 
occurring from FDI globalization. This raises a question about the quantitative relevance of our 
results. To assess the contribution of FDI globalization to aggregate productivity growth, we 
relate counterfactual simulations to the actual structural changes that occurred in Japan’s 
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manufacturing sector over the last decade (1996–2006). Given that the model simulations are 
based exclusively on reductions in FDI barriers and cannot account for all other economic factors 
that affected Japan between 1996 and 2006, such a comparison is limited. Nonetheless, this 
period of falling FDI barriers serves as a useful benchmark to gauge the quantitative magnitude 
on various changes in FDI barriers and to assess what dimensions of the actual historical changes 
are captured well in our simulations. 
=== Table 6=== 
 Table 6 compares counterfactual simulations generated from 25%, 20%, and 10% reductions 
in variable and fixed barriers against the actual changes that occurred over the last decade. We 
find that the counterfactual simulations are able to capture several important dimensions of the 
actual historical changes. First, a 20% reduction in FDI barriers delivers a similar magnitude of 
multinational growth that occurred within the last decade, fairly capturing the growth in foreign 
production abroad (106.2% vs. the actual 99.0% growth) and the growth in the number of 
multinational firms (66.7% vs. the actual 72.0% growth).   
Second, the simulations roughly follow the asymmetric growth pattern experienced in Japan.  
In the actual changes, large expansions in multinational activity and contractions in domestic 
activity led to higher realized growth for the top productivity quintile (14.7%) relative to the 
lower 80% of firms (6.5%). The model generates similar patterns of high growth for the top firms 
(7–36%) relative to the less productive firms. Unlike the actual changes, our simulations find a 
contraction of the bottom 80% of firms. This difference is expected given that our model is based 
on static simulations that do not account for any growth aspects that occurred during the ten year 
period. Importantly, the intra-industry reallocations theorized by the model are strongly supported 
by both the data and simulations: larger, more productive firms expand at a disproportionate rate 
relative to smaller, less productive firms in both the real and simulated realizations of data. 
Overall, a 15–25% reduction in variable and fixed FDI barriers delivers substantial 
reallocation of Japanese technological resources, which loosely follows the structural changes 
32 
 
that occurred over the last decade. This level of reduction roughly translates into aggregate 
productivity improvements in the range of 10–40%. To place this in perspective, over the last 
decade, Japan’s domestic aggregate productivity grew by less than 10%.25 Thus our numerical 
results suggest that the disproportionate expansion of highly productive multinationals over the 
last decade may have generated improvements in Japanese technological resource reallocation 
that resulted in larger aggregate productivity gains than those realized from both within firm 
technological improvements and domestic reallocation of activity. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 This paper applied a simulation framework to quantitatively investigate how multinationals 
respond to declining FDI barriers and the implications for aggregate productivity. Our work 
makes the following contributions. First, using a detailed dataset of Japanese manufacturing firms, 
we found that the sales and entry patterns were consistent with a heterogeneous firm model of 
multinationals facing both fixed and variable barriers. An adapted version of the EKK model was 
capable of replicating both in-sample and out-of-sample activity, supporting both the internal and 
external validity of the model. Second, our counterfactual simulations illustrated how falling FDI 
barriers could lead to important changes in intra-industry reallocations. Consistent with the 
structural changes observed in the data, more efficient firms disproportionately expand while less 
efficient firms suffer net contractions. Lastly, we found that the type of FDI barriers has 
significantly different consequences for aggregate productivity improvements, whereby 
reductions in variable FDI costs generate more pronounced intra-industry reallocations than 
reductions in fixed FDI costs. 
 Our numerical simulations are the first attempt to measure the impact of FDI globalization 
on intra-industry reallocations and its implications for aggregate productivity. We provide 
important quantitative evidence that falling FDI barriers have contributed to structural changes in 
                                                  
25 Aggregate productivity estimates vary but fall within the range of 0-2% per year for the last two 
decades (Inui et al., 2009). 
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Japan’s manufacturing sector. As investment barriers continue to decline across the world, our 
work suggests that the further restructuring towards multinational production in Japan and other 
advanced economies will be an important source of global economic development. 
 Our application of the EKK framework to multinational production is a promising 
approach to quantify the aggregate implications of FDI integration. Further improvements in 
this micro-simulation framework could lead to a rich computational tool useful for policy 
analysis. Since our application focused exclusively on FDI, a natural extension is to combine 
the exporting and FDI activities into an integrated micro-simulation framework. This would 
allow the analysis to capture the role of intra-firm trade in multinational production. Another 
extension is to apply the model to more FDI-specific policy issues. Moving beyond ad-hoc 
hypothetical reductions in FDI barriers, the model could be used to investigate changes in foreign 
taxes on multinationals and reductions in FDI specific regulations. Lastly, as our work has 
focused primarily on the manufacturing sector, an examination of the heavily regulated service 
sector would also be an important case study of interest for policy makers.  
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Table 1. Firm Distribution by Initial Size of Year 1996
  # All Firms # Multinationals 
Initial Size 
Interval 
(percentile) 
Year Change from 
1996 
Year Change 
from 19961996 2006 1996 2006 
0-10 1,411 1,376 -35 0 3 3 
10-20 1,410 1,276 -134 5 13 8 
20-30 1,411 1,178 -233 3 20 17 
30-40 1,412 1,229 -183 11 40 29 
40-50 1,412 1,202 -210 16 36 20 
50-60 1,414 1,191 -223 27 73 46 
60-70 1,411 1,299 -112 51 113 62 
70-80 1,413 1,229 -184 75 185 110 
80-90 1,412 1,409 -3 184 359 175 
90-99 1,270 1,309 39 464 677 213 
99-100 141 157 16 124 137 13 
Total 14,117 12,855 -1,262 960 1,656 696 
Notes: Percentile bins are determined by parent firms' total sales in 1996; all firms include 
domestic and multinational firms in manufacturing; we exclude the firms whose domestic sales 
are missing.  
Source: Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities, and Basic Survey of 
Overseas Business Activities from METI. 
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Table 2 Average Volume of Production by Size Interval in 1996 and 2006 
  Domestic Production per Firm Foreign Production per Multinational Total Production per Firm 
Size Interval Year Change from 
1996 
Year Change 
from 1996 
Year Change 
from 1996 (percentile) 1996 2006 1996 2006 1996 2006 
0-10 0.86  0.83  -0.03  0.00  0.10  0.10  0.86  0.83  -0.03  
10-20 1.47  1.43  -0.04  0.17  0.25  0.08  1.47  1.43  -0.04  
20-30 2.01  1.99  -0.02  0.31  0.27  -0.04  2.01  2.00  -0.01  
30-40 2.64  2.66  0.02  0.24  0.57  0.33  2.64  2.68  0.03  
40-50 3.49  3.56  0.06  0.70  0.81  0.11  3.50  3.58  0.08  
50-60 4.67  4.87  0.19  0.65  1.04  0.39  4.68  4.93  0.25  
60-70 6.54  7.02  0.48  1.09  1.26  0.18  6.58  7.15  0.57  
70-80 10.1  11.0  0.97  1.47  2.17  0.69  10.2  11.4  1.24  
80-90 19.1  21.4  2.34  2.93  4.23  1.30  19.5  22.6  3.13  
90-99 86.9  100.1 13.2  19.2  29.7  10.6  93.9  116.7  22.7  
99-100 1,664 1,570 -94.3  306.8  638.8  331.9  1,934  2,143  208.9  
All 29.5  30.1  0.59  49.7  57.3  7.65  32.9  37.5  4.59  
Notes: Percentile bins are determined by parent firms' total sales in each year, separately; production is in billions of 2006 Yen; domestic production 
includes domestic and export sales; total production includes both domestic and foreign production. 
Sources: Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities, and Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities from METI. 
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Table 3. Estimation Results of Structural Parameters     
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Markets Markets with  over 10 affiliates All Markets 
Markets with  
over 10 affiliates 
Markets with  
over 10 affiliates 
Year 2006 2006 2006 1996 
Moments All All No Pecking Order String All 
Variable 
ߠ෨ 1.99 2.12 1.95 2.13 
(size dispersion) (0.43) (0.95) (0.64) (0.53) 
ߪ௔ 1.64 1.64 1.66 1.36 
(variance of sales shock) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) 
ߪఎ 0.39 0.52 0.34 0.45 
(variance of entry shock) (0.31) (0.16) (0.42) (0.43) 
ߩ -0.62 -0.55 -0.64 -0.99 
(correlation of sales and entry shocks) (0.34) (0.25) (0.51) (0.56) 
Notes: Figures indicate parameter estimates of each variable; parentheses are bootstrapped standard errors from the initial fixed parameter estimates 
with 1000 repetitions; each bootstrapping simulates 100,000 firms and uses randomly sampled Japanese firms. 
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Table 4.1 Aggregate Outcomes of Counterfactual 20% Reductions in FDI Barriers 
    (1) (2) (3) 
 Country Code Relative Change in Real Wage 
% Change in 
Japanese Firm Entry 
% Change in 
Japanese Firm Sales
Argentina ARG 1.08  93.1  81.1  
Australia AUS 1.14  84.8  98.8  
Belgium BEL 1.46  39.5  155.9  
Brazil BRA 1.05  105.3  88.8  
Canada CAN 1.17  73.9  116.6  
China CHN 1.25  64.6  71.5  
Czech Republic CZE 1.23  67.4  79.0  
France FRA 1.18  66.9  125.4  
Germany DEU 1.09  98.2  101.4  
Hong Kong HKG 4.92  -42.1  277.2  
Hungary HUN 1.31  63.3  109.1  
India IND 1.02  111.5  82.8  
Indonesia IDN 1.03  98.4  72.1  
Italy ITA 1.07  100.8  93.4  
Japan JPN 1.01  -2.67  -3.45  
South Korea KOR 1.05  109.4  89.2  
Malaysia MYS 1.22  73.3  78.3  
Mexico MEX 1.06  97.3  80.2  
Netherlands NLD 1.31  18.6  146.2  
New Zealand NZL 1.21  70.7  96.7  
Philippines PHL 1.11  88.3  89.0  
Poland POL 1.11  87.4  87.4  
Singapore SGP 1.74  16.4  192.1  
South Africa ZAF 1.07  96.6  84.0  
Spain ESP 1.12  91.0  100.5  
Sweden SWE 1.31  59.3  128.2  
Taiwan TWN 1.10  94.8  118.4  
Thailand THA 1.24  64.9  71.9  
Turkey TUR 1.06  99.3  84.9  
United Kingdom GBR 1.23  56.9  139.3  
United States USA 1.07  98.4  99.7  
Vietnam VNM 1.17  73.2  72.8  
Average  1.29  72.5  103.4  
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Table 4.2 Counterfactual Results for Aggregate Firm Activities 
Variable Baseline Counterfactual Change from Baseline 
% Change from 
Baseline 
Number of Firms:       
   All 13,123  -350  -2.67  
   Multinationals 1,511  1,004  66.4  
Aggregate Production: 
   Domestic 394.3  -13.6  -3.45  
   Foreign 99.8  107.1  107.3  
   Total 494.1  93.5  18.9  
Note: Production is in trillions of Yen.  
 
 
Table 4.3 Counterfactual Results for the Extensive Margin 
  # Multinationals # All Firms 
Initial Productivity 
Group (percentile) Baseline 
Counterfactual 
Change from 
Baseline 
Baseline 
Counterfactual 
Change from 
Baseline 
0-10 0  6  1,313  -345  
10-20 0  21  1,312  -2  
20-30 0  34  1,313  -1  
30-40 2  53  1,312  -1  
40-50 22  62  1,312  -1  
50-60 45  82  1,312  0  
60-70 79  118  1,312  0  
70-80 146  177  1,313  0  
80-90 322  259  1,312  0  
90-99 766  191  1,181  0  
99-100 130  0  130  0  
Total 1,511  1,004  13,123  -350  
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
Table 4.4 Counterfactual Results for the Intensive Margin 
Domestic Production per Firm Foreign Production per Multinational Total Production per Firm 
Initial Productivity 
Group (percentile) Baseline 
Counterfactual 
Change from 
Baseline 
Baseline 
Counterfactual 
Change from 
Baseline 
Baseline 
Counterfactual 
Change from 
Baseline 
0-10 13.7  -0.14  0.00  1.34  13.7  -0.13  
10-20 14.6  -0.37  0.00  1.27  14.6  -0.35  
20-30 16.0  -0.42  0.00  1.54  16.0  -0.38  
30-40 17.9  -0.52  0.69  0.90  17.9  -0.45  
40-50 19.5  -0.48  0.75  1.31  19.5  -0.36  
50-60 22.0  -0.50  1.04  1.50  22.0  -0.29  
60-70 26.1  -0.67  1.58  1.92  26.2  -0.24  
70-80 31.5  -0.67  2.36  3.14  31.7  0.42  
80-90 41.4  -0.88  5.01  6.16  42.6  2.84  
90-99 76.5  -1.61  32.0  31.44  97.3  29.1  
99-100 293.0  -6.17  563.2  486.7 855.4  481.3  
All 30.0  -0.24  66.1  16.22  37.7  8.4  
Note: Production is measured in billions of Yen.
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Table 5.1 Counterfactual Aggregate Results for Variable and Fixed Costs 
Variable Baseline 
Counterfactual % Change from Baseline 
Variable Cost Fixed Cost 
Number of Firms:       
   All 13,123  -1.32  -0.37  
   Multinationals 1,511  28.0  30.56  
Aggregate Production: 
   Domestic 394.3  -0.74  -0.28  
   Foreign 99.8  64.0  19.7 
   Total 494.1  12.11  4.41  
Note: Production is in trillions of Yen.  
 
 
Table 5.2 Counterfactual Changes from Baseline at the Extensive Margin 
  # Multinationals # All Firms 
Initial Productivity 
Group (percentile) Variable Cost Fixed Cost Variable Cost Fixed Cost 
0-10 3  3  -171  -48  
10-20 9  11  0  0  
20-30 11  14  0  0  
30-40 14  15  0  0  
40-50 20  22  0  0  
50-60 29  31  0  0  
60-70 45  50  0  0  
70-80 70  79  0  0  
80-90 114  123  0  0  
90-99 100  108  0  0  
99-100 0  0  0  0  
Total 415  455  -172  -48  
Note: Baseline is fixed as in Table 4.3. 
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Table 5.3 Counterfactual Changes from Baseline at the Intensive Margin 
 Domestic Production per Firm Foreign Production per Multinational Total Production per Firm 
Initial Productivity 
Group (percentile) Variable Cost Fixed Cost Variable Cost Fixed Cost Variable Cost Fixed Cost 
0-10 0.08  0.10  0.86  0.83  0.08  0.10  
10-20 -0.03  0.06  0.95  0.95  -0.03  0.07  
20-30 -0.07  0.06  0.61  0.27  -0.05  0.07  
30-40 -0.04  0.07  0.60  0.21  -0.02  0.09  
40-50 -0.04  0.07  0.69  0.23  0.00  0.10  
50-60 -0.05  0.10  0.79  0.28  0.03  0.15  
60-70 -0.03  0.12  1.13  0.38  0.13  0.22  
70-80 -0.03  0.14  1.60  0.60  0.35  0.40  
80-90 -0.05  0.18  3.50  1.21  1.53  1.06  
90-99 -0.08  0.34  18.21  6.03  15.76  7.65  
99-100 -0.35  1.52  314.8  82.5  313.5  83.8  
All 0.18  0.20  18.4  1.65 5.11  1.84  
Note: Production is measured in billions of Yen. 
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Table 6. Summary of Counterfactual Results
  
Actual % 
Change between 
1996 and 2006 
Counterfactual Reductions in Variable Barriers: 
25% 20% 15% 20% 0% 
Counterfactual Reductions in Fixed Barriers: 
Counterfactual Percentage Change 25% 20% 15% 0% 20% 
Volume of Production             
    Domestic -7.0 -4.6 -3.4 -4.1 -0.7 0.3 
    Foreign 99.0 148.1 106.2 71.0 64.0 19.7 
    Total 4.0 25.5 16.8 11.2 12.1 4.4 
     Production Growth by Bottom 80% Firms* 6.5 -4.4 18.9 -4.6 -0.9 0.4 
     Production Growth by Top 20% Firms* 14.7 36.3 30.0 21.2 21.0 7.8 
Number of Firms 
     All -9.0 -3.5 -2.7 -2.4 -1.3 -0.4 
     Multinational 72.0 85.9 66.4 48.6 28.0 30.6 
Aggregate Productivity 
     Contributed by: 37.4 27.2 20.1 18.1 4.1 
        Market-Share Reallocation n.a. 35.9 26.0 19.1 17.6 4.0 
        Exit of Least Productive Firms n.a. 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.5 0.1 
Notes: Figures are in percentage; aggregate productivity is a percentage change in industry-level productivity of simulated firms resulting from market-share 
reallocation and exit effects; * refers to a percentage point change. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. The Price Index 
 Following Eaton et al. (2011), a representative consumer in market n faces the following 
price index, ௡ܲ: 
௡ܲ ൌ ഥ݉ ቂ׭ቀ∑ ׬ ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻܿିሺఙିଵሻ݀ߤ௡௜ሺܿሻ
௖ҧ೙೔ሺఎሻ
଴
ே
௜ୀଵ ቁ ݃ሺߙ, ߟሻ݀ߙ݀ߟቃ
ିଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ
  (A1) 
where ݃ሺߙ, ߟሻ is a joint density function from which we draw demand and entry shocks 
specific to individual producers, ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ and ߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ. To solve for the price index, we first rewrite 
the integral over ߤ௡௜ሺܿሻ ൌ ௜ܶሺݓ௡݀௡௜ሻିఏሺܿሻఏ in equation (A1): 
௡ܲ ൌ ഥ݉ ቂ׭ቀߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ∑ Φ௡௜ ׬ ߠܿఏିఙ݀ܿ
௖ҧ೙೔ሺఎሻ
଴
ே
௜ୀଵ ቁ ݃ሺߙ, ߟሻ݀ߙ݀ߟቃ
ିଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ
  (A2) 
where Φ௡௜ ൌ ௜ܶሺݓ௡݀௡௜ሻିఏ. Note that ݀ߤ௡௜ሺܿሻ ൌ Φ௡௜ߠܿఏିଵ݀ܿ. 
From the laws of integration, we can solve for the integral over c: 
௡ܲ ൌ ഥ݉ ቂ׭ቀߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ∑ Φ௡௜
ఏ
ఏିሺఙିଵሻ
ܿҧ௡௜ሺߟሻఏିሺఙିଵሻ
ே
௜ୀଵ ቁ ݃ሺߙ, ߟሻ݀ߙ݀ߟቃ
ିଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ
 (A3) 
Substituting the threshold unit cost, ܿҧ௡௜ሺߟሻ, into equation (A3), and rearranging gives: 
௡ܲ ൌ ഥ݉ ቈߢ଴ ׭ቆߙ௡ሺ݆ሻ ∑ Φ௡௜ ൬ቀߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ
௑೙
ఙா೙೔
ቁ
ଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ ௉೙
௠ഥ
൰
ఏିሺఙିଵሻ
ே
௜ୀଵ ቇ ݃ሺߙ, ߟሻ݀ߙ݀ߟ቉
ିଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ
 (A4) 
where ߢ଴ ൌ
ఏ
ఏିሺఙିଵሻ
. 
By moving the price-index term to the left side, we obtain the following: 
 ௡ܲ ൌ ഥ݉ሺߢଵ߰௡ሻ
షభ
ഇ ܺ௡
ቀభ
ഇ
 ି  భ
഑షభ
ቁ       (A5) 
where:  
                           ߢଵ ൌ ߢ଴׭ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ
ഇషሺ഑షభሻ
഑షభ ݃ሺߙ, ߟሻ݀ߙ݀ߟ 
                           ߰௡ ൌ ∑ Φ௡௜ே௜ୀଵ ሺߪܧ௡௜ሻ
షሾഇషሺ഑షభሻሿ
഑షభ . 
 
 
B. Respecification for Simulation 
 Substituting the price index in equation (A5) into equation (9), and rearranging gives: 
ܿҧ௡௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ቀ
ఎ೙ሺ௝ሻ
ఙா೙೔
ቁ
ଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ
ቀ ௑೙
఑భట೙
ቁ
భ
ഇ       (B1) 
Replacing equation (B1) into equation (10), we arrive at: 
ܺ௡௜ሺߙ, ߟሻ ൌ ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ
ഇషሺ഑షభሻ
഑షభ
఑బ
఑భ
 ߨ௡௜ܺ௡     (B2) 
where: 
ߨ௡௜ ൌ
Φ೙೔ሺఙா೙೔ሻ
షሾഇషሺ഑షభሻሿ
഑షభ
ట೙
. 
 From this point, we focus on a country pair between a host country i and a home country J, 
where J denotes Japan. We proceed to express equations (B1) and (B2) in terms of a 
standardized unit cost. Rearranging equation (11) gives ݖJሺ݆ሻ ൌ Jܶ
భ
ഇݑሺ݆ሻ
షభ
ഇ . Substituting this 
expression into equation (1), we obtain ܿ௡௃ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ൬
௨ሺ௝ሻ
Φ೙಻
൰
భ
ഇ
. The threshold unit cost for entry is 
then given by: 
ܿҧ௡௃ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ൬
௨ഥሺ௝ሻ
Φ೙಻
൰
భ
ഇ
          (B3) 
Using equations (B1) and (B3), we can rewrite the entry condition as follows: 
ݑሺ݆ሻ ൑ ݑതሺ݆ሻ          (B4) 
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where: 
ݑതሺ݆ሻ ൌ ߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ
ഇ
഑షభ
௑೙గ೙಻
఑భఙா೙಻
         (B5) 
We can also express the sales condition in terms of the standardized unit cost. Replacing the unit 
cost for firm j and the threshold unit cost in equation (10), we obtain: 
ܺ௡௃ሺ݆ሻ ൌ
ఈ೙ሺ௝ሻ
ఎ೙ሺ௝ሻ
ߪܧ௡௃ ቀ
௨ഥሺ௝ሻ
௨ሺ௝ሻ
ቁ
഑షభ
ഇ        (B6) 
Finally, we parameterize the entry and sales conditions by connecting the conditions with actual 
data on aggregate multinational production. We first express the total number of firm entries to 
market n from Japan as: 
௡ܰ௃ ൌ ׬ൣߤ௡௃ሺܿҧ௡௃ሺߟሻሻ൧ ݃ଶሺߟሻ݀ߟ       (B7) 
Substituting ߤ௡௃ሺܿሻ ൌ Φ௡௃ሺܿҧ௡௃ሺ݆ሻሻఏ and equation (B1) into equation (B7), we obtain: 
௡ܰ௃ ൌ ߢଶ
௑೙గ೙಻
఑భఙா೙಻
           (B8) 
Replacing equation (B8) into (B5) gives: 
ݑതሺ݆ሻ ൌ ߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ
ഇ
഑షభ
ே೙಻
఑మ
          (B9) 
This expression corresponds to equation (12). 
 We then proceed to connect the sales condition with data by replacing ܺ௡ߨ௡௃ in equation 
(B8) with data. Integrating equation (B2) across the joint density ݃ሺߙ, ߟሻ, total sales by firms 
from Japan in country n are given by:   
ܺ௡௃ ൌ ׭ߙ௡ሺ݆ሻߟ௡ሺ݆ሻ
ഇషሺ഑షభሻ
഑షభ
఑బ
఑భ
 ߨ௡௜ܺ௡ ݃ሺߙ, ߟሻ݀ߙ݀ߟ   (B10) 
Rearranging gives ܺ௡௃ ൌ ߨ௡௜ܺ௡. Substituting this expression in equation (B8), we obtain: 
ߪܧ௡௃ ൌ
఑మ
఑భ
௑೙಻
ே೙಻
           (B11) 
Replacing equation (B11) into equation (B6) gives: 
ܺ௡௃ሺ݆ሻ ൌ
ఈ೙ሺ௝ሻ
ఎ೙ሺ௝ሻ
Xഥ௡J
఑మ
఑భ
ቀ௨ഥ
ሺ௝ሻ
௨ሺ௝ሻ
ቁ
഑షభ
ഇ        (B12) 
where Xഥ௡J  ൌ ܺ௡J/ ௡ܰJ. This expression corresponds to equation (13). 
 
C. Estimation Framework 
 Our estimation procedure is based on Eaton et al. (2011). We proceed to (1) simulate 
artificial firms under a particular set of parameter values, (2) construct a set of four moments, 
and (3) search an optimal set of structural parameters by the simulated method of moments. 
Throughout this section, we denote home country i, by J (Japan) and an artificial firm s by 
ݏ ൌ 1, 2, … , ܵ. 
 
C.1 Simulation of Multinational Firms 
 We use the entry and sales conditions in equations (12) and (13) to simulate individual 
multinational activities. An artificial producer s is generated from its efficiency draw, ݑሺݏሻ, 
sales shock, ߙ௡ሺݏሻ, and entry shock ߟ௡ሺݏሻ. These simulated draws are generated from the 
stochastic distributions as dictated by the four structural parameters in Θ:  heterogeneity in 
observed sales ߠ෨, variances in sales ߪ௔ and entry shocks ߪఎ, and correlation between these 
shocks ߩ. With aggregate data on the number of Japanese firms investing in country n, ௡ܰ௃, 
and their aggregate sales X௡௃ in that country and Θ, we can produce an artificial dataset of 
heterogeneous multinationals on the location and sales of their foreign affiliates. 
To simulate the total number S of firms, we first fix Θ and construct realizations for 
standardized unit cost, uሺݏሻ, for each firm s. Demand and entry shocks, ߙ௡ሺݏሻ and ߟ௡ሺݏሻ, are 
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generated from a joint lognormal distribution for each firm s across country n.26 These 
realizations of stochastic components are fixed throughout the estimation. We then compute the 
entry hurdle condition (12) for each artificial firm across each market and define an indicator 
variable Z of whether each firm establishes local production in each market n:  
ܼ௡௃ሺݏሻ ൌ ቄ
 1           if ݑሺݏሻ ൑ ݑത௡ሺݏሻ
0                    otherwise
      (C1) 
When the entry indicator is equal to one, a simulated firm from country J (Japan) enters the 
market. Conditional on entry, we compute its sales in market n according to the sales condition 
(13). We then construct the matrix of sales for each artificial firm across each market that 
indicates where each artificial firm sets up a foreign affiliate and how much sales it generates in 
that country. 
 
C.2 Moments 
 With an artificial dataset of individual multinational entry and sales, we construct a vector 
of moments. Each moment is defined as the share of multinational parent firms that fall into a 
set of mutually exclusive bins. We denote ܰ௞ as the number of actual firms achieving an 
outcome k in the actual data, and ෡ܰ௞ as the number of simulated firms achieving the same 
outcome. For each moment, the number of simulated firms falling into each outcome is 
weighted as follows: 
෡ܰ௞ ൌ ଵ
S
∑ ݑതሺݏሻܼ௡௃
௞S
ୱୀଵ ሺݏሻ        (C2) 
where ݑതሺݏሻ is the importance weight of each simulated firm. We define a vector of deviations 
between actual and artificial moments for outcome k: 
ݕሺΘሻ ൌ ݉௞ െ ෝ݉௞ሺΘሻ        (C3) 
 Following the theoretical implications of the model, we choose four moment conditions: 
pecking order strings, affiliate sales distributions across markets, parent sales distribution in 
Japan, and multinational production intensity. Corresponding to these moments, we also 
construct a vector of moments from the actual data on Japanese multinational firms. As 
described in empirical regularities of Japanese firms, we seek to capture these characteristics for 
simulated multinationals. Given that N is the number of foreign markets penetrated by Japanese 
firms, each moment is defined as follows: 
 
1. Pecking order string 
We compute the share of multinationals entering each possible combination of the five most 
popular countries for Japanese multinationals: China, the United States, Thailand, Taiwan, and 
Indonesia in 2006. Determining the market popularity by the number of their foreign affiliates 
                                                  
26 We assume that ߙ௡ሺݏሻ and ߟ௡ሺݏሻ have a joint bivariate lognormal distribution: 
൤
lnߙ௡ሺݏሻ
lnߟ௡ሺݏሻ
൨~ N ቈቀ0
0
ቁ , ቆ
σαଶ ρσαση
ρσαση σηଶ
ቇ቉. 
To draw these realizations of random shocks, we use the Choleski decomposition factor to construct 
ln  and lna η with:  
൤
lnߙ௡ሺݏሻ
lnߟ௡ሺݏሻ
൨~ ቈቆσαඥ1 െ ρ
ଶ ρσα
0 σ௛
ቇ቉ ൤൬
ܽ௡ሺݏሻ
݄௡ሺݏሻ
൰൨.
 To avoid drawing the firms that end up not selling anywhere, productivity draws are bounded to the 
firms that sell in Japan and at least one foreign market. In doing so, we use the importance sampling 
from ݑሺݏሻ ൌ ݒሺݏሻݑത௃כሺݏሻ, where random realizations of ݒሺݏሻ are independently drawn from a 
uniform distribution over interval [0,1] and uതJכሺsሻ is the firm-specific hurdle for entering the 
Japanese market and at least one foreign market. As this measure serves as a sampling weight, we 
ensure that all draws are to be uሺsሻ ൑ uതJכሺsሻ, which corrects an upward bias in generating more 
efficient firms.
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we set each string such that multinationals entering the most popular market (China) invest in 
less popular markets progressively. Then, we make another combination for that string such that 
multinationals entering the first (China) and third (Thailand) invest in less popular markets 
progressively. By adding up all possible combinations, we have 25 moments. 
 
2. Sales distributions across foreign markets 
We calculate qth percentiles for multinational sales in each market n, for q =50, 75, 100. For 
each set of firms that enter market n, we use these percentiles to set up sales intervals. We then 
calculate the share of multinationals that fall into each of these bins. The qth percentiles are 
calculated from the actual data and the simulated firms are set according to these bins. (N × 3 
moments). 
 
3. Distribution of multinational parent sales in Japan 
This moment links the level of sales in Japan to the set of firms that enter market n. We 
calculate qth percentiles (q = 50, 75, 100) over domestic sales in Japan for each set of firms that 
enter market n. These intervals are calculated from the actual data. We then assign the firms that 
fall into these bins and calculate the share of multinationals (N × 3 moments). 
 
4. Multinational production intensity 
We make two intervals for firms whose ratio of sales in market n to sales in Japan is below and 
above the 50th percentile. Then, we compute the share of simulated firms that sell in each market 
n and fall into either of these percentiles.  
 
 
C.3 Simulated Method of Moments 
 Equation (C3) shows that an optimal set of parameters can be judged from the distance 
between actual and artificial moments, with the smaller distance indicating better parameters. To 
estimate the parameters, we employ simulated method of moments as introduced by McFadden 
(1989). This estimation method matches moments of simulated and real data, and searches for a 
set of parameters that minimizes the total distance between them. Under the true set of 
parameter values, Θ଴, the following moment condition is assumed to hold: 
EሾݕሺΘ଴ሻሿ ൌ 0        (C4) 
An objective function is specified under the following weighted quadratic form: 
Θ෡ ൌ argminΘ൛ݕሺΘሻ′ W ݕሺΘሻൟ       (C5) 
where Θ෡  is a set of estimated parameters, and W is assumed to be an identity matrix in practice.   
 To search for the parameters that best fit the model, we employ the Nelder-Mead simplex 
method (Nelder and Mead, 1965). To mitigate optimization errors, we introduce random 
variations to the starting values and repeat the minimization algorithm for a fixed set of artificial 
and real moments 1000 times. Finally, we take the optimal parameters that give the minimum 
distance. 
 The search procedure above should provide the best fitting parameters. However, they may 
be subject to sampling errors of real Japanese multinationals and simulation errors of artificial 
multinationals. To address these issues, we compute bootstrapped standard errors for the initial 
optimal estimates. First, we resample Japanese multinational firms from the actual dataset with 
replacement. A dataset of simulated multinationals is also generated from a new set of 
idiosyncratic parameters ݑୠሺݏሻ, ߙ௡௕ሺݏሻ, and ߟ௡ୠሺݏሻ. Then, we follow the simulated method of 
moments to estimate a new set of structural parameters, Θ෡௕. Repeating 25 times, we calculate: 
ܸሺΘሻ ൌ ଵ
ଶହ
∑ ሺΘ෡௕ െ Θ෡
כ
ሻሺΘ෡௕ െ Θ෡
כ
ሻ′ଶହଵ       (C6) 
where Θ෡כ is the initial set of the best fitting structural parameters. Taking the square root of the 
diagonal elements, we obtain the bootstrapped standard errors. They serve to gauge the potential 
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influence of sampling and simulation errors in the best fitting parameters. 
 
 
D. Counterfactual Simulations 
D.1 General Equilibrium Framework 
 Following the approach in EKK (2011), each country is endowed with an amount of labor, 
ܮ௜, which is mobile across sectors but not countries, and has a wage rate ௜ܹ. Intermediates are a 
Cobb-Douglass combination of labor and intermediates with an input bundle of ௡ܹ
ఉ
௡ܲ
ଵିఉ. Final 
output is also non-traded and is a Cobb-Douglas combination of manufactures and labor, with 
manufactures having a share ߛ. 
 Profits are earned by the country where the firm is headquartered and consumers own equal 
shares of each firm headquartered in their country.  This allows profits to be redistributed 
equally among the consumers of their country. Country i’s total GDP, ௜ܻ஺ is equal to its total 
wages generated from production in the country, ௜ܹܮ௜ and its total profits abroad Π௜. Lastly, 
countries have FDI deficits ܦ௜, where some countries are net receivers of FDI and some are net 
providers. Net profits earned in destination n are gross profits ܺ௡ ߪ⁄  minus total entry costs 
incurred there, where total profits are Π௡஽ ൌ
ఙିଵ
ఙఏ
ܺ௡. In equilibrium, firms or multinationals 
from country i earn a share ߨ௡௜ from the total level of profits Π௡஽ from each market:  
Π௜ ൌ ∑ ߨ௡௜Π௡
஽ ൌ ఙିଵ
ఙఏ
ே
௡ୀଵ ௜ܻ       (D1) 
Country i’s total GDP, ௜ܻ஺ is equal to its total wages generated from production in the country, 
௜ܹܮ௜ and its total profits from abroad Π௜: 
௜ܻ
஺= ௜ܹܮ௜ ൅ Π௜         (D2) 
Total demand for manufacturing production in country i, ௜ܺ, must be equal to final demand and 
use of manufactures in intermediates: 
௜ܺ ൌ ߛ൫ ௜ܻ
஺൯ ൅ ሾ
ሺଵିఉሻሺఙିଵሻ
ఙ
ሿ ௜ܺ      (D3) 
The first component is the share of manufacturing production from final demand and the second 
component is the share from its use as intermediates. Using the profit expression (D1) and the 
income equation (D2), the demand equation (D3) can be respecified as: 
௜ܺ ൌ ߛ ቀ ௜ܹܮ௜ ൅
ఙିଵ
ఙఏ ௜ܻ
ቁ ൅ ቂ
ሺଵିఉሻሺఙିଵሻ
ఙ
ቃ ௜ܺ     (D3) 
Assuming that gross manufacturing production in market ܺ௡ is equal to gross manufacturing of 
all production with n’s technology ௜ܻ plus an FDI sales deficit ܦ௡, we have: 
௜ܻ ൌ
ሾఊఙሺௐ೔௅೔ሻାሾିఉఙାఉିଵሿ஽೔ሿఏ
ఙఏିఙఊାఊିሺఙିଵሻሺଵିఉሻఏ
       (D4) 
ܺ௡ ൌ
ሾఊఙሺௐ೔௅೔ሻାሾିఉఙାఉିଵሿ஽೔ሿఏ
ఙఏିఙఊାఊିሺఙିଵሻሺଵିఉሻఏ
൅ ܦ௡      (D5) 
With ߨ௡௜ ൌ
Φ೙೔ሺఙா೙೔ሻ
షሾഇషሺ഑షభሻሿ
഑షభ
ట೙
 from (B2) and ߰௡ ൌ ∑ Φ௡௜ே௜ୀଵ ሺߪܧ௡௜ሻ
షሾഇషሺ഑షభሻሿ
഑షభ  from (A5), we 
can write: 
 ߨ௡௜ ൌ
்೔ቀௐ೙
ഁ௉೙
భషഁ ௗ೙೔ቁ
షഇ
ሺఙா೙೔ሻషሾഇష
ሺ഑షభሻሿ/ሺ഑షభሻ
∑ ்೔ሺௐ೙
ഁ௉೙
భషഁௗ೙೔ሻషഇ
ಿ
೔సభ  ሺఙா೙೔ሻ
షሾഇషሺ഑షభሻሿ/ሺ഑షభሻ
          (D6) 
and the following price equation: 
௡ܲ ൌ ഥ݉ߢଵ
ିଵ/ఏ ቂ∑ ௜ܶሺ ௡ܹ
ఉ
௡ܲ
ଵିఉ݀௡௜ሻିఏሺߪܧ௡௜ሻିሾఏି
ሺఙିଵሻሿ/ሺఙିଵሻே
௜ୀଵ ቃ
ିଵ/ఏ
ቀ௑೙
ௐ೙
ቁ
ቀభ
ഇ
ቁିଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ
   (D7) 
Equilibrium in the world market for manufacturers, ௜ܻ ൌ ∑ ߨ௡௜ܺ௡ே௡ୀଵ , sets up a system of 
equations where changes in real wages and price levels, ௡ܹ and ௡ܲ,can be solved following an 
exogenous decrease in ݀௡௜ and/or ܧ௡௜. As is the case for welfare gains from trade in the 
heterogeneous firm model, the reductions in FDI barriers would lead to welfare gains from a 
decline in price levels ௡ܲ (through better access to cheaper goods) and a rise in real wages ௡ܹ 
58 
 
(through increased production from rising productivity).  
 Following Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2008), rather than estimating all the parameters 
embedded in the model, the equations can be respecified in terms of the counterfactuals and 
their rate of change. The merit of this method is that it requires no information on the initial level 
of technology, variable FDI barriers, and fixed costs to entry. Under this specification, the change 
of wages ෡ܹ௡ and the changes in manufacturing price indices ෠ܲ௡ around the world can be solved 
from exogenous changes in መ݀௡௜ or ܧ෠௡௜ (where the hat indicates the ratio of counterfactual to 
baseline).  Given Θ, ߪ, ߚ, ߛ and global FDI shares (not just for Japan), a simple iterative 
algorithm may be used to jointly solve for changes in wages and prices resulting from an 
exogenous decrease in FDI barriers.   
 
D.2 Data for Counterfactuals 
 In addition to the benchmark parameters estimated inΘ , the counterfactual exercise requires 
additional parameters that need to be calibrated. We use Kang’s (2008) estimate of the elasticity 
of substitution for the Japanese manufacturing sector and set ߪ = 2.1. For labor shares ߚ, we 
take the averages reported in UNIDO across countries and set ߚ = 2.4. 
 To construct a dataset on bilateral FDI activity, we rely on several data sources. We use the 
RIETI FDI Database for aggregate sales of foreign affiliates of Japanese multinationals in 2006. 
For other bilateral pairs, affiliate sales are estimated from the UNCTAD data on FDI stocks and 
flows for the period 1990-2006. In doing so, we first construct bilateral FDI stocks in 2006 for 
each country pair. Missing figures for bilateral FDI stocks are approximated by the cumulative 
stocks of FDI flows over 1990-2006. As FDI flows were negative for certain country pairs and 
periods, an estimate of FDI stocks in 2006 becomes negative for some country pairs. In this case, 
we replace zero FDI stocks. When the figures remain missing, we assume zero FDI stocks for 
the corresponding country pairs. 
 Furthermore, we estimate total FDI stocks in manufacturing sectors by multiplying the 
figures by 21%. This figure is an average share of manufacturing FDI as reported in the World 
Investment Report (2010). Finally, we multiply the FDI stocks by 2.0198 to convert into sales 
by foreign affiliates. This factor is based on the estimated relationship between FDI stocks and 
affiliate sales, as shown in the World Investment Report (2010). 
 We use the World Bank’s World Development Indicators for data on GDP and 
manufacturing value-added. To construct a measure of the production that employs domestic 
technology, we approximate domestic production from value-added. Following an estimate for 
the average ratio of total sales to value-added in UNIDO, valued-added is converted into total 
sales by a multiplying factor of 2.745. Second, we subtract total sales of inward FDI from total 
domestic sales to discount the contribution of foreign technology. Lastly, FDI deficits are 
calculated by subtracting total sales of outward FDI from total sales of inward FDI. 
 
